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Much of the prevailing wisdom about agrarian change in South Asia stems from 
perceptions about and experiences in irrigated agriculture, particularly in the 
indo-Gangetic plain. Views about the 'frozen', uncompetitive nature of land 
markets, economic polarization, distress sales as a means to accumulate land, 
increasing landlessness, landlords' exploitation of tenants, and extreme frag- 
mentation of holdings are common (Myrdal. 1968; Ladejinsky, 1965). 
Such thinking was the coqsensqs view immediately following independence 
when agrarian relations in several parts of India were essentially feudal. The 
response by the central and state governments was to enact legislation designed 
to abolish intermediaries, secure title and occupancy rights for tenants, control 
rents paid by tenants, limit-holding size, and consolidate holdings. 
The imporfarice of agrarian reform did not go unnoticed by Indian econo- 
mists. Writings on agrarian structure and reform occupied more pages of the 
Indian Journal of Agricultural Economics in the late 1940s and early 1950s than 
those on any other topic. 
During the last 20 years issues related to the land market have receded in 
importance on the agriculhlral policy agenda. Still, the earlier authoritative 
assertions persist. Compared to land markets in Southeast Asia, those in South 
Asia often look more imperfect and hence more susceptible to reinforcing and 
accentuating political and economic inequality within a village, locality or 
region (Hayarni, 1981). 
The aim of this paper is to determine how well the perceived stylized facts fit 
representative, predominantly dryland agricultural, regions and villages in 
India's Semi-Arid Tropics. The villages arc representative of five broad soil, 
climatic and cropping regions of India's Semi-Arid Tropics. Data collection in 
three study regions, Mahbubnagar (in Andhra Pradesh) and Sholapur and Akola 
(in Maharashtra) started in 1975 when a panel was drawn from a random 
stratified sample of small, medium and large farming and landless labour 
households in each village. Forty households were selected in each village, 10 
from each stratum (Jodha et d., 1977). Household and farm management data 
were collected by a resident investigator at 3 to 5 week intervals (Singh er a!., 
1985). In 1980, similar household panels were initiated in Sabarkantha district 
of Gujarat and in 1981 in Raisen district of Madhya Pradesh. Two villages per 
*Iruemational hops Rescuch Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics OCRISAT). 
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five study regions and apanel of 30 households in eachvillage gives a sample size 
of 400 households. 
This paper is a condensed version of a chapter in Ryan and Walker (fonhcom- 
ing) which is a synthesis of the results of the ICRISATvillage studies in the three 
regions selected in 1975. The geographic coverage in the paper is wider than Ryan 
and Walker, as findings from Jhe five study regions are reported. 
Four topics related to land and agricultural development are analyzed: (1)  
agrarian change; (2) farm size and land productivity; (3) tenancy; and (4) land 
fragmentation and subdivision The presentation of these topics is organized 
along a common three-part format. First, and at the risk of building a straw man, 
the conventional wisdom is described to put the results from the study villages in 
perspective. Then, the findings are summarized. Finally, explanations are put 
forward to account for the results. The paper concludes with several implications 
for agrarian policy. 
AGRARIAN CHANGE: THE SHAPING OF THE 
DISTRIBUTION OF LANDHOLDINGS 
Based on National Sample Survey (NSS) data, Raj (1976) marshalled some 
empirical evidence to support the view of increasing economic polarization 
where wealthier landowners accumulate property at the expense of smaller and 
more marginal farm households. Raj's interpretation of the evidence and the 
hypothesis of increasing economic polarization in the pattem of landholdings did 
not go unchallenged in the Indian agricultural economics literature (Vyas, 1979). 
Gradually, in the 1980s, an empirical consensus has emerged on the pattem of' 
agrarian change. P. significant and steady decline in the area under large holdings 
and a rise in both the total area and number of small and marginal holdings is 
reliably documented by analysts using diverse data sources (Lawninarayana and 
Tyagi (1982). NCAER (1986) and Bussink and Subbarao (1986)). Fairly fresh 
evidence from in-depthvillage studies in India's Semi-Arid Tropics also supports 
these trends. In particular, large landholders losing ground both absolutely and 
proportionately is reported in Attwood (1979); Caldwell et al. (1982). Harriss 
(1986), and Gadre et al. (1987). . 
Landlessness and the concentration of landholding 
Data from a retrospective survey in 1984 are consistent with that emerging 
consensus. Across the ten villages, landgainers, who were landless in 1950 
shortly after independence, outnumbered landlosers, who owned land in 1950 
and possessed less than 05 acres in 1982, by a ratio of 6:l. The majority of 
landgainers purchased land t!!ugh self-generated savings. 
The finding of landgainers outnumbering landlosers is unlikely to be affected 
by selectivity bias in the failure tc account for people who lost land and 
subsequently left the village. Loss of land under extenuating circumstances was 
not a motivation for emigration among the few panel household heads who 
emigrated since 1975. Some of these emigrants still own land in their villages. 
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In general, the concentration of owned laid holding has not increased 
appreciably since 1950. The movement toward equality in land ownership was 
greatest in the villages where the distribution of landholding was the most 
skewed 'm 1950. In six villages, the snapshot of thc land ownership distribution 
in 1982 unambiguously shows less inequality than the picture taken in 1950; in 
two, transparent concIusions cannot be dras1n because the Lorenz curves, 
depicting the distribution of owned holdings in 1950 and 1982, cross; and in the 
other two villages, where land was most equitably held of the study villages in 
1950 and where the largest holding in the sample did not exceed 30 acres in 1950 
or 1982, the concentration of owned holdings has increased somewhat. 
The shedding of land by the larger land-owning households in 1950 is the 
overriding consideration in the trend towards broadening equality in the owner- 
ship distribution. In each region, the upper one-third landed households in 1950 
parted with about half of their holding by 1982. In contrast, the smallest tercile 
of land owners in 1950 had on average the same amount of land in 1982. Smaller 
holdings also disproponionately bought more land than larger holdings charac- 
terized by greater relative sales. For the small holders in the lowest tercile, 
purchases compensated for sales so that the mean size of landholding did not fall. 
Land market activity and distress sales 
Given the ecological and demographicconditions of the villages, the land m k e t  
should be inactive, and the distress motive should loom large in accounting for 
why land is offered for sale (Binswanger and Rosenzweig, 1986). But the 
retrospective data do not reinforce the perception of a frozen land market. 
Purchase and sale transaction since the father's inheritance to 1982-3 were 
greater than the number of sample cultivator households in each study region. 
Across the ten villages, about as much land was bought and sold as was 
partitioned through inheritance. 
Undeniably, the land market is thin because the reservation price of the seller 
usually exceeds the offer price of the buyer. The land market is also personal. But 
entry as a buyer is not restricted. Property rights to land are well established and 
secure, limiting the scope for opportunistic land grabbing. 
The relatively low incidence of distress sales is a major reason why purchases 
and sales in the land market have not led to greater inequality in land ownership. 
Only a small minority of the land sales since 1950 were to cancel debt to satisfy 
short-run consumption needs (Cain, 1981). When the frequency of sales is 
charted over time we see no evidence of clustering in bad production years, 
which is what Binswanger and Rosenzweig's analysis of production relations 
would predict. 
Raising money for dowry and financing tbe purchase of assets were the most 
common reasons given by respondents for selling land. The felt need for social 
investment in dowry by large land-owning huseholds was associated with 
heightened land market activity. 
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Forces shaping the pattern of landho Iding 
Increasing population pressure should be assigned pride of place in explaining 
changes in landholding in the recent past. Between 195 1 and 198 1, the increase 
in village population has ranged from 35 to 50 per cent. In addition to the 
demographic transition, the low rate of net emigration is a main contributor to 
village population growth. 
Immigration into the villages since 1950 has not contributed significantly to 
landlessness. ?he unimportance of immigration in explaining landlessness 
reflects the lack of agricultural economic growth in these dryland study villages. 
Institutional amsiderations also played a major role. Altbough little land has 
changed hands directly because of land ceiling and tenancy legislation and 
although land ceilings arc relatively easy to evade, the threat of confiscation is 
perceived as real by large farmers. 
Land transactions since inheritance were often associated with productive 
investment Land owners sometimes sold more remote dryland felds and either 
purchased land adjacent to their well or sank the sales receipts into well digging, 
desilting or deepening, The profitability of wetland agriculture was further 
enhanced by public subsidies on fertilizer, diesel and, most importantly, electric- 
ity. Such subsidies and the greater pace of technical change in irrigated agricul- 
ture certainly diminished aquisi tive pressures on predominantly rainfed land. 
Conspicuous for their absence were events, such as the great&pression in the 
early 1930s in Amvood's (1979) study village or the fall in cotton prices 
following the American Civil War ( C a w c h ,  1970), that significantly deter- 
mined the course of land ownership. Undoubtedly, because of substantial 
government assistance, the 'never in a hundred years* Maharashtra drought in 
1971-3 was not one of those events. 
Last, but not least, the initial conditions for polarization in landholding were 
not present in the villages. Only one of the villages has a recent history of 
landowner absenteeism. The incidence of pure tenhcy is also very low. There- 
fore, a scenario of landowners evicting tenants in response to abrupt technical 
change was and is extremely unlikely. 
FARM SIZE AND LAND PRODUClXVITY AND QUALITY 
Based on the Farm Management Studies, a negative relationship between owned 
area and production per acre of owned area was conclusively documented in the 
1950s (Barry and Cline, 1979). The inverse association was still visible six years 
after the advent of the Green Revolution (Bhatta, 1979). Findings from more 
recent micro-studies suggest that the inverse relationship between land produc- 
tivity and farm size has weakened considerably (Parthasarathy, 1987). The two 
explanations most commonly put fonvard to account for the inverse relationship 
are the superior land quality of small visd-vis large farms and labour market 
dualism reflected in a higher effective wage cost of hired than family labour 
(Bhalla, 1979). 
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The importance offarm size in determining average land productiviry 
3 
Much of the empirical research on the relationship between farm size and land 
productivity fails to account for possibility of differential effects of changes in 
operated area (through tenancy holding owned area constant) vis-d-vis adjust- 
ments 4.1 owned area (Verma and Bromley, 1987). Binswanger and Roscnzweig 
(1986) have shown that there are theoretical reasons relating to labour supervi- 
sion and access to collateral to support the case for differential effects. 
Results in four of the five regions confirm the Binswanger and Rosenzweig 
hypothesis that operational and owned holding will be signed different1y:ceteris 
paribus, operated area is negatively associated with land productivity while 
owned area is positively correlated. Only in the more irrigated villages was an 
inverse relationship between land productivity and owned area (weakly) sup- 
?orted in multivariate regression analysis. 
In general, several other considerations overshadowed farm size in account- 
ing for the variation in annual land productivity among cultivator panel house- 
holds within the same study regiotl. Jn each region, the strongest statistical 
correlate to average land productivity was land quality, measured by percentage 
irrigation, and land value. The strength of this relationship reflects the presence 
of considerable variation in land quality within the villages. 
Differences in land productivity among caste groups were also quite sizeable 
and statistically significant in three regions. Castes with significantly higher land 
productivity had one trait in common- their traditional and primary occupation 
was farming. 
Apart from the effect on operated area, the longer-term propensity to engage 
in tenancy transactions was associated with significant differences in land 
productivity in three of the five regions. In thi  rainfall-assured, black-soil 
villages, where dryland can be productively and profitably farmed, the ranks of 
farmers who sharecrop out their Iand is largely filled by individuals who are not 
that committed to farming. Some suffer from alcoholism or are addicted to 
gambling. Others are primarily interested in occupations outside agriculture. 
Thus, information on tenancy behaviour over several years is valuable in 
identifying management skills and cornmiunent which translate into higher Iand 
productivity. Because such management differences exist and are manifested in 
the market for tenancies, more economic value can be produced from land with 
tenancy than if farmers were restricted to cultivating their own landholding. 
In some of the study villages, large farmers own higher-priced land less 
susceptible to crop failure, in others, small farm households possess supecior 
quality land, and in yet others land revenue rates, land prices, or the incidences 
of crop failure are not significantly different between large farm and other 
cultivator households (Singh and Walker, 1952). These results are location 
specific, and they cast doubt on the universality and applicability of broad 
generalizations about farm site and land qualiry in India's SAT. 
One landquality-related feature common to several of the study villages is the 
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inferior soil quality of sharecropped compared to owner- opera~ed plots. Across 
the villages, the mean per hectare value of owner-operated plots was about 15 per 
cent higher than sharecropped plots (Singh and Walker, 1982). 
TENANCY 
When one thinks about tenancy in South Asia, or anywhere in the world for that 
matter, the stereotype that comes in mind is large landlords exploiting tenants in 
narrowly specified, rigid contractual arrangements. That stereotype appears to be 
what the framers of tenancy legislation had in mind in India in the late 1940s and 
early 1950s. 
Extent and type of tenancy 
The incidence and characteristics of sharecropping and fixed rent tenancies 
display considerable regional and even locational specificity in India's SAT. Jn 
the study villages with greater access to irrigation or characterized by a more 
assured production environment, 80 to 90per cent of gross cropped area is owner- 
operated. In contrast, in the most drought prone villages, 3 0 4 0  per cent of grcss 
cropped area is share- cropped. 
This regional variation has persisted since the village studies started in 1975. 
For the same drought prone villages, where tenancy is most prevalent, the level 
of tenancy today is about the same as chronicled by Dantwala and Donde (1949) 
for villages in the same region after independence. 
Reverse tenancy with the smallest farm households leasing out their land to 
larger farm households is quite common. Farming small amounts of land doesnot 
confer much economic advantage over participation more actively in the casual 
labour market or temporarily migrating for off-farm work. The absence of a well- 
developed market for hiring draft power: also increased the supply of tenancies by 
small farm households who often do not own bullocks. 
Although both sharecropping and fixed renting coexist in each village, 
sharecropping is more common. But the incidence of pure sharecropping is low, 
about 1 household in 25 during any cropping year. As in much of India, most 
tenancy is mixed: sharecroppers and fixed renters also cultivate their own land 
during the cropping seasons. 
Tenns, conditions, explanations, and changes 
The brief duration of most leases is another feature of tenancy that is widely 
shared by the study villages. The majority (about 60 per cent) of sharecropping 
and fixed rent contracts were for only one cropping season. Although enforce- 
ment of tenancy legislation has been directly responsible for the transfer of only 
about 100 acres in the study villages, landowners are certainly aware of the threat 
of losing land to tenants on longer term leases (Cain, 1981). 
Several other generalizations can be drawn about the tenns and conditions of 
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sharecropping transactions (Jodha, 1981). The diversity of mangements to 
reflect individual landowner and tenant circumstances is conspicuous. Oral 
tenancy agreements are often flexible enough to incorporate mid-seasonprduc- 
tion contingencies. Linked transactions between land and other factor and 
product 'markets are not that prevalent accounting for about 12 per cent of 
tenancy <transactions. Many tenancy arrangements improved the risk bearing 
capacity of the landowner as risk was transferred to or shared by the tenancy 
(Walker and Jodah, 1986). Finally, unless the owner provided a considerable 
quantity of purchased inputs, the tenant chose the cropping system. Taken 
together, these five generalizations a11 point to the overriding conclusion that 
tenancy agreements are entered into by mutual consent and not by coercion. 
Although farmers gave many reasons for tenancy, the most common expla- 
nation for most transactions centred on resource adjustment (Jodha, 1981). In 
particular, with tenancy, 1and:bullock ratios were more equitable between 
owners and prospective tenants than without tenancy, which to some extent also 
compensates for incomplete insurance markets in these dryland agricultural 
villages where production risk i s  high. 
The market for tenancies is also dynamic. Tenant groups farming well- 
irrigated land was unheard of 20 years ago in the study village where it now 
occurs. More recently, in response to a tightening labour market, large farmers 
in one of the villages have shown a preference to give prospective permanent 
hired help tenancy contracts instead of employing them as regular farm servants. 
Production eficiency and sharecropping 
Classical economists and, later and more formally, Marshall indicted sharecrop- 
ping for its inefficiency because of diminished incentives to apply variable 
inputs to land. The main competing school of thought is Cheung's approach 
(1969) which assumes that landlords can effectively and inexpensively monitor 
tenants' effort on sharecropped land. 
Building on Bell (1977). Shaban (1 987) assessed the productive inefficiency 
of sharecropping in the study villages by comparing factor intensities and 
productivity indices between owned and sharecropped land within the same 
household. Controlling for the effects of soil quality and the use of irrigation, 
sharecropping was associated with a sizeable decline inoutput and in the average 
use of family labour and bullock draft. Differences in fertilizer use were 
explained by variation in access to irrigation. Hence, the village data confirm the 
popular perception that sharecropping does result in efficiency losses in dryland 
agriculture. Landlords cannot cost effectively monitor the work performance of 
tenants. 
FRAGMENTATION AND SUBDIVISION 
Seasoned obstrvers of agrarian structure and reform in Lndia agree on one thing: 
land fngmentation exacts a heavy toll in economic inefficiency (Danwala, 
1959; Ladejinsky, 1965; Mosher, 1966; Nanavati, 1953 and Thomsr 1965). 
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Consolidation potentially enhances the attractiveness of farm investment oppor- 
tunities particularly those, such as tubewell irrigation, relating to land and water 
management. In spite of these apparent benefits and operational programmes in 
most states, consolidation schemes have only been successful on a widespread 
scale in irrigated Punjab, Haryana and western Uttar Pradesh 
Extent and cost of landfiogmcntation 
Empirical results from analysis of the retrospective survey and plot cultivation 
data in the ten study villages show that land fragmentation, measured independ- 
ently of farm size, is not an important problem in the dry Semi-Arid Tropics of 
India (Ballabh and Walker, 1986). Holdings are much less fragmented than in 
some other Indian regions, most notably eastern India, where consolidation could 
foster the harnessing of unexploited groundwater resources. Moreover, untapped 
resources are not abundant; thus, the opportunity cost of reduced productivity 
potential usually attributed to fragmentation is considerably less than in the more 
favourably endowed environments. Furthermore, from the private prospective of 
individual farmers, the level of land fragmentation is not increasing appreciably 
over time. Holdings today are about as fragmented as they were 25 years ago. 
Although farmers perceived that the cost of fragmentation exceeded the 
benefits from holding more spatially dispersed holdings, estimates at the house- 
hold or field level did not show cererisparibus that land productivity was lower 
on more fragmented farms. Indeed, for three of the five regions, household net 
returns per hectare were strongly and positively correlated with land fragmenta- 
tion (after accounting for variation in household resource endowments and 
personal characteristics in a regression analysis). To explain this finding. one can 
hypothesize that less able fanners deselected themselves from the set of h g -  
mented landholders by selling land to more committed farmers. While that 
hypothesis merits closer scrutiny, the evidence was clear from the detailed 
longitudinal plot and household data that fragmentation was not an economic 
liability at prevailing levels of technology. 
From the more social perspective of watershed-based development, which 
figures prominently in the central and state governments' plans for dryland 
agriculture, a different picture emerges. Within a watershed, encompassing one 
or more villages, fragmentation in number of owners and/or cultivators and plots, 
is rising. 
Subdivision 
Largely because of land subdivision at inheritance, plot size is also decreasing. 
About one plot in three was subdivided among sons at inheritance (Ballabh and 
WaUcer, 1986). Still, the potential to subdivide land was much greater than what 
was actually realized. Seven1 plot, household and regional characteristics 
significantly influenced suMvision, but the impact of demographic determi- 
nants was most pronounced. More heirs and older heirs increased the predicted 
probability of plot subdivision.Turning to land characteristics, plot size had a less 
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marked effectpn subdivision than the total land endowment in number of plots 
and farm size. But, small plots, falling below the 25 per cent cumulative 
perenlife. w e n  much less likely to be subdivided than others. Variation in soil 
quality also had a marked effect on the decision to subdivide land. Villagers w e n  
extremely reluctant to subdivide plots on shallower soils. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Much of the conventional wisdom. described at the outset of this paper and 
prevailing in the 1950s. 1960s and on into the 1970s, about agrarian change in 
South Asia does not presently hold for these dry land study villages. The case for 
inmasing household differentiation and economic polarization in the owner- 
ship of land is clearly rejected by our empirical analysis. Some measure of land 
reform has been implicitly and cost effectively achieved through increasing 
population pressure and land ceiling regulations. 
Tenancy legislation has to some extent served its purpose and has led to the 
demise of contractual forms that were conducive to the exploitative acquisition 
of land. Now pure tenancy is rare in the villages, mixed tenancy is relatively 
common, and so is reverse tenancy. The agrarian landscape the legislation was 
designed to modify represents a subsmtial departure from current village 
reality. 
One popular belief was supported. Sharecropping was indicted for its 
productive inefficiency. Mixed tenants cultivated the land they own signifi- 
cantly more intensively than the land they sharecropped. 
Two aspects of these efficiency losses warrant comment. First, they are 
attributed primarily to the suboptimal utilization of labour and bullock draft per 
unit of land. Allocation of purchased inputs at these relatively low use levels was 
not affected significantly by alternative tenurial forms. Secondly and more 
importantly, it would be wrong to infer that banning or legally eliminating 
sharecropping would yield significant gains to society. If the option of share- 
cropping was made less available, some of the owners would have had to fallow 
land that was sharecropped. Others would have cultivated land (destined for 
sharecropping) as or even more extensively than did prospective tenants. 
Based on our results, one would be hard pressed to recommend that investing 
in consolidation programmes should be accorded a high priority in Lndia's dry 
semi-arid tropics. The significance of differences in soil quality in influencing 
plot suMivision within the household highlights the degree to which soil 
heterogeneity can inhibit plot exchange in a consolidation prognmrne within a 
village. Soils are much more homogeneous in the areas of northwestern India 
where government consolidation programmes have recorded notable successes. 
Finally, to the extent that land fragmentation is a problem it should be tackled 
at its source by making it less attractive for heirs to resort to the equal division 
of all plots. Land subdivision is not preordained but is conditioned by forces that 
operate at the plot, household and regional levels. Comparative research on ways 
to increase the cost of plot subdivision at inheritance should be assigned 3 high 
priority on the consolidation'research agenda. 
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